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Abstract – This paper uses a recent increase in Wisconsin’s tobacco 
tax as a natural experiment to measure the economic incidence of 
tobacco taxation, using micro-level data on cigarette prices from 
retail locations in Wisconsin and states that share its border. We 
fi nd that Wisconsin’s $1 tobacco tax increase was over-shifted 
to consumers; they pay the entire amount of the tax as well as a 
premium of between 8–17 cents per pack of cigarettes. We also use 
geo-coded data to test if the incidence of the tobacco tax is different 
for locations near the border of states with different tobacco taxation. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Tobacco taxation is an important revenue source at the state and federal level, and as a matter of policy is also 
intended to reduce tobacco consumption. The federal govern-
ment collected over $7.7 billion in revenue from tobacco taxes 
in 20061, while state governments in the aggregate collect 
an additional $15.2 billion annually in tobacco taxes.2 A key 
component to understanding how effective a tobacco tax is 
at reducing consumption3 is how the economic incidence of 
the tax is split between consumers and producers. If the full 
burden of a tobacco tax is passed on to consumers in the form 
of higher prices it is more likely to discourage consumption, 
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 1 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade 
Bureau, “Cumulative Summary, Fiscal Year 2006,” http://www.ttb.gov/
statistics/fi nal06.pdf.
 2 See U.S. Census Bureau, “State Government Tax Collections,” http://
www.census.gov/govs/www/statetax.html. This fi gure does not include 
additional sales taxes collected on tobacco.
 3 The economic justifi cation for government intervention in the market for 
tobacco products is that tobacco use (especially smoking tobacco) causes a 
negative externality. For studies that measure the external effects of tobacco 
use see Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker (1989), Manning et al. (1989, 1991), 
Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994), Viscusi (1995, 2002), Evans, Ringel, and 
Stech (1999), Cutler et al. (2000), and Sloan et al. (2004). For studies that 
measure the mortality cost per pack see Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Cutler 
(2002), Sloan et al. (2004), and Viscusi and Hersch (2008). There have been 
a wide variety of studies that analyze the demand for cigarettes, notably 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999), 
and Gruber and Koszegi (2001). For a comprehensive review of studies on 
cigarette demand see Chaloupka and Warner (2000).
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and may be a more regressive tax because 
tobacco users tend to be low income 
individuals.4
Estimates of the incidence of tobacco 
and cigarette taxation fi nd a wide range 
of results; from the tax burden being over-
shifted to consumers (they pay the full tax 
plus a premium on top of the tax amount) 
to concluding that tobacco taxes do not 
raise prices by the amount of the tax. 
Harris (1987) and Keeler et al. (1996) both 
provide evidence using state level data 
that show the burden of tobacco taxation 
is over-shifted to consumers, although 
their estimates of the amount of over-
shifting differ dramatically. Sumner and 
Wohlgenant (1985) estimate that only the 
amount of the tax is passed on to consum-
ers, while Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) 
suggest that excise tax increases do not 
consistently act to increase retail prices. 
We estimate how the economic burden 
of a tobacco tax is divided between retail 
suppliers of cigarettes and consumers by 
examining the price response to a recent 
$1 change in Wisconsin’s state cigarette 
tax. Our estimates have several advan-
tages over previous estimates of tobacco 
tax incidence. First, we use micro-level 
data from retail locations matched to 
both city and county taxes, instead of 
relying on state-year variation (which 
cannot account for different city and 
county tax rates). Second, we analyze an 
isolated policy change that offers clean 
identifi cation of the effects of the tobacco 
tax increase on retail prices. Third, our 
data come from an extremely short time 
window and relatively small geographic 
area, so we do not have to correct for 
infl ation over time or adjust for cost of 
living across areas. Finally, our data are 
geo-coded so we are able to test the price 
responsiveness of retailers that are near a 
bordering state where the tax treatment 
of tobacco sales is different.
We fi nd that the $1 tax increase results 
in a statistically signifi cant retail price 
increase of between $1.08–1.17 depending 
on the econometric specifi cation we use, 
the type of cigarettes, and the type of retail 
establishment. We find consistent evi-
dence of over-shifting across both panel 
and repeated cross-section econometric 
specifi cations, and for both name brand 
and generic cigarettes. We also show that 
the amount of over-shifting is sensitive 
to how far the retail establishment is 
from the Wisconsin border and the state 
border in question, although these results 
are somewhat imprecise. Stores near the 
Minnesota border (where the tobacco 
tax is lower after the law change) do not 
have as large of an over-shifting premium. 
Stores near the Michigan border (where 
the tobacco tax is higher before and after 
the law change) have a larger over-shifting 
premium.
We fi rst give the details of Wisconsin’s 
tobacco tax change, and lay out our 
identification strategy for estimating 
the incidence of tobacco taxation. Sec-
tion III provides a description of our 
unique micro-level data on cigarette 
prices at retail establishments. Section 
IV presents and discusses our regression 
results for estimating the incidence of 
tobacco taxation; it also includes a discus-
sion of potential criticisms of our meth-
odology. The fi nal section of the paper 
concludes. 
II. POLICY CHANGE BACKGROUND 
    AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We use a recent increase in the tax 
on cigarettes in the state of Wisconsin 
as a natural experiment to identify the 
incidence of tobacco taxation. Beginning 
January 1, 2008, Wisconsin increased the 
state tax on cigarettes by $1, from 77 cents 
to $1.77 per pack.5 While the cigarette tax 
 4 For a review of this literature see Poterba (1989), Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), and Gravelle (2007).
 5 WI Act 20, amend sec. 139.31(1) (a) and (b), signed into law on October 26, 2007.
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increased by over 125 percent in Wiscon-
sin at the start of 2008,6 the states that share 
a border with Wisconsin did not change 
their tax treatments of cigarettes at that 
time. Table 1 shows the tax on cigarettes 
in Wisconsin and the surrounding states 
before and after the tax increase took 
effect. As shown in Table 1, Wisconsin 
went from having the lowest tax on ciga-
rettes to having the second highest in the 
group of states that share its border. 
We use the differential change in Wis-
consin and absence of change in states 
that share its border to identify how the 
tax affects the retail tax inclusive price, 
and thus measure the incidence of the tax. 
The policy change we analyze refl ects a 
substantial tax increase compared to other 
recent tobacco tax changes. Since Janu-
ary 1, 2000 there have been 83 separate 
state level cigarette tax increases,7 with 
a median increase of 39 cents per pack. 
Wisconsin’s $1 increase matches the larg-
est one time tobacco tax increase by any 
state since 2000.8 
We use a difference-in-differences 
(D-D) approach to identify the retail price 
response to the cigarette tax change. We 
compare the difference in the retail price of 
cigarettes in Wisconsin with surrounding 
states before the tax change (December, 
2007) with the difference in prices between 
Wisconsin and surrounding states after 
the tax change (January, 2008). The main 
advantage of using this method is that it 
controls for any fi xed characteristics of 
Wisconsin as well as any time trends in 
all states that may also affect cigarette 
prices. 
Using the D-D method requires two 
primary assumptions. The first is that 
there are no factors other than the tax 
increase that affect the change in cigarette 
prices between December, 2007 and Janu-
ary, 2008 in Wisconsin. This assumption 
seems particularly reasonable given that 
the time elapsed between our data points 
is at most 42 days. The second assump-
tion is that prices in our control states 
(IA, IL, MI, and MN) are not affected by 
the policy change in Wisconsin. Our data 
show that this assumption is not violated 
on average, as the price change in our 
control states is less than 1 cent for the full 
sample.
We implement the D-D identifi cation 
strategy using both data from a panel and 
repeated cross sections of retail cigarette 
venders. The regression used to determine 
Table 1 
State Cigarette Tax Package
Illinois1,2,3
Iowa3
Michigan
Minnesota
Wisconsin3
December ‘07
$0.98 
$1.36 
$2.00 
 $1.485 
$0.77 
January ‘08
$0.98 
$1.36 
$2.00 
 $1.485 
$1.77 
Notes:
1Cook County, IL has an additional $2 per pack tax 
on cigarettes.
2The City of Chicago has an additional 68 cents per 
pack tax on cigarettes.
3WI, IL, and IA have different sales tax rates by city and 
county, we include these rates, as well as state rates 
for MN and MI in our analysis. A complete listing of 
sales tax rates used for all 270 cities in our sample is 
available from the authors upon request.
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators, “Cigarette 
Tax Increases 2000–2008,” http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html
 6 We expect an immediate response in the retail price of cigarettes on January 1, 2008 because of the way the 
new tax is collected. According to conversations with administrators at the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
the Wisconsin tobacco tax increase was also levied on inventories of cigarettes at the retail level on January 
1, 2008. Store owners were required to pay the new tax on all cigarettes in inventory as of January 1, 2008. 
Although this raises some concerns about the price response of retailers prior to the tax change, it means that 
we expect an immediate price response when the tax is enacted.
 7 Oregon is the only state to decrease the tobacco tax during this time period, doing so by 10 cents at the beginning 
of 2004. See Federation of Tax Administrators, “Cigarette Tax Increases 2000–2008,” http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html.
 8 Since 2000 Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Montana, South Dakota, and Texas also increased the tax per pack of 
cigarettes by $1.
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the effect of the tax increase using the 
panel data is:
(1) (Pi,jan – Pi,dec) = α + β1(Wisconsin) + εi
where Wisconsin is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the store is located in 
that state, and Pi,jan and Pi,dec are the tax 
inclusive price of cigarettes for store i in 
January and December. Analyzing a panel 
of stores and using the change in price as 
our dependent variable means that we 
control for any attributes of the store that 
remain constant between December, 2007 
and January, 2008 such as the type of retail 
establishment (for example whether the 
store is a convenience or grocery store) 
and its location. Because we have informa-
tion about the type of retail establishment, 
we run regressions for (1) using our entire 
panel as well as separate regressions for 
the various types of establishments, and 
for stores that are within a short distance 
of the state border. 
The parameter of interest in (1) is β1, 
which shows how the $1 tax increase in 
Wisconsin affects the change in cigarette 
prices. If β1 < 1, this implies that the full 
burden of the tax is not passed on to con-
sumers, as some of the tax burden falls on 
cigarette retailers. If β1 = 1, then the burden 
of the cigarette tax increase is fully borne by 
consumers in the form of higher prices. If β1 
> 1, the tax on cigarettes is “over-shifted” to 
consumers, as they bear the entire burden 
of the tax and pay a premium above the 
tax amount. If the tax is over-shifted to 
consumers, it is likely that the retail market 
for cigarettes is imperfect.9 
We also implement the D-D identifi ca-
tion strategy using a repeated cross section 
of stores in our data. This strategy allows 
us to use all stores for which we have 
price data on in at least one time period 
(December or January). The regression 
used to determine the effect of the tax 
increase using the repeated cross section 
of stores is:
(2) Pi,t = α + β1(Wisconsin) + β2(January) 
   + β3(Wisconsin * January) + Zi′γ + εi
where, as in the panel regression, Wiscon-
sin is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
store is located in that state. For cross-sec-
tion identifi cation, Pi,t is the tax inclusive 
price from store i in time period t, where t 
is either December, 2007 or January, 2008. 
January is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the observation is from the period after 
the tax increase. Z is a vector of control 
variables that includes a dummy variable 
indicating whether the store is a national 
retailer, a dummy variable indicating if 
the store is a tobacco-only retailer, a con-
venience store, or a grocery store. Z also 
includes a dummy variable for the state 
level location of the store. The coeffi cient 
of interest in (2) is β3, which has the same 
interpretation as β1 in (1).
III. DATA 
Our data come from telephone surveys 
of cigarette retailers at tobacco specialty, 
grocery, and convenience stores in Wis-
consin, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and the 
upper peninsula of Michigan. We created 
a list of 1,542 stores that sell cigarettes in 
these states using phone book listings and 
internet searches by geography.10 We con-
tacted each establishment in December, 
2007 (before the tax increase) and again 
in January, 2008 (after the tax increase) to 
request the retail price of cigarettes.
 9 For a detailed discussion of theoretical models of tax incidence that produce over-shifting see Fullerton and 
Metcalf (2002).
10 We created the majority of our store list using an internet search engine by searching “tobacco store” and 
“convenience store” by geography for each state in our sample. This search provided the store name, phone 
number, and address for the stores in our sample. 
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We implemented the first phase of 
surveys between December 17, 2007 and 
December 23, 2007. In the pre-tax change 
wave, 70 percent of stores provided price 
information, for a total of 1,072 data 
points.11 We implemented the second 
phase of surveys between January 9, 
2008 and January 28, 2008. A total of 1,107 
stores provided cigarette price informa-
tion in the post-tax change phase, a 72 
percent response rate.12 We created our 
panel using the 65 percent of stores on 
our list (1,002 stores) that provided price 
information in both the pre-tax change 
and post-tax change phases.
We requested price information on two 
types of cigarettes from the stores in our 
survey—a premium brand and generic 
brand.13 Our survey consisted of the fol-
lowing questions:
• “What is the price per pack of Name 
Brand Cigarettes?” 
• “Does that price of Name Brand ciga-
rettes include the sales and tobacco 
tax?” 
• “What is the price per pack of Generic 
Brand Cigarettes?” 
• “Does that price of Generic Brand 
cigarettes include the sales and 
tobacco tax?” 
A total of 614 (57 percent) out of the 
1,072 stores that gave price information 
for the name brand cigarettes in the fi rst 
phase also gave price information for the 
generic brand cigarettes. In the second 
phase, 641 (58 percent) out of the 1,107 
stores that gave price information on the 
name brand also gave price information 
on the generic brand.14
In the fi rst phase of our survey, about 28 
percent of stores from which we were not 
able to obtain price information actively 
refused to give the price of cigarettes. 
In the second phase about 26 percent of 
stores from which we were not able to 
obtain price information actively refused 
to give the price of cigarettes.15 Table 2 
highlights the difference in stores that 
refused to give price information with 
those that responded to our survey. As 
11 In the fi rst wave of surveys, 470 “stores” did not yield price information. Of these, 68 did not sell cigarettes, 
82 were either a wrong phone number or a disconnected line, 134 refused to give cigarette price information 
over the phone, 163 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 23 were not used because of various reliability 
concerns. 
12 In the second wave of surveys, 435 “stores” did not yield price information. Of these, 40 did not sell cigarettes, 
94 were either a wrong number or a disconnected line, 115 refused to give cigarette price information over the 
phone, 137 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 49 were not used because of various reliability concerns. 
13 To keep consistent across locations we asked for the same name and generic brand from each store surveyed.
14 According to conversations with the Wisconsin and Minnesota Departments of revenue the total number 
of cigarette retailers in those states is about 13,000 and 9,500, respectively (including bars and restaurants). 
Administrators in Iowa, Michigan, and Illinois were not able to provide an estimate of the number of cigarette 
retailers.
15 Note that the share of stores that actively refused to give price information was a small share of the total stores 
that we contacted—8 percent in the fi rst phase and 7 percent in the second phase. 
Table 2
Comparison of Survey Respondents and Refusals
December January
Convenience
Grocer
Tobacco
Chain
Respondents
809
156
107
434
Refused
108
 17
  9
 77
Percent 
Refusing
11.78
 9.83
 7.76
15.07
Respondents
835
157
115
455
Refused
101
  6
  8
 66
Percent 
Refusing
10.79
 3.68
 6.50
12.67
Note: The refusal rate is calculated as the number who actively refused to give price information divided by the 
number who responded plus the number who refused.
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the table shows, convenience stores were 
more likely to actively refuse to give 
price information than both grocery and 
tobacco-only stores. Also, stores that 
were national chains were more likely to 
actively refuse than other stores. Because 
there are differences in the response rate 
across the type of stores, we are careful to 
account for store type in our estimation 
strategy.
We merged information on state, 
county, and city sales taxes, gathered 
from each state’s department of revenue,16 
with our price data to calculate the tax-
inclusive price for each observation.17 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa have dif-
ferent sales tax rates across cities, while 
cities in the upper peninsula of Michigan 
all have a 6 percent sales tax rate. In addi-
tion to the state of Illinois tobacco taxes, 
Cook County, IL has a $2 tax per pack, and 
the city of Chicago has a 68 cents tax per 
pack. We contacted each state department 
of revenue (as well as city and county 
where appropriate) to ensure that there 
were no other changes, besides the $1 per 
pack increase in Wisconsin, made to sales 
or cigarette taxes between December 17, 
2007 and January 28, 2008 for the cities in 
our sample.
We classifi ed the stores in our data by 
retail establishment type based on the 
store name. We classifi ed stores as tobacco 
specialty, grocery, or convenience stores. 
We were also able to differentiate those 
that were national chain stores from 
local or regional establishments. Out of 
the 1,002 stores in our panel data, 101 
(10 percent) are tobacco specialty stores, 
148 (15 percent) are grocery stores, and 
the remaining 753 (75 percent) are con-
venience stores. About 40 percent (406 
stores) are national chain retailers.
In addition to information about the 
type of retail establishment, we also have 
the street address for each store in our 
sample. We use GIS software to calculate 
the distance from the Wisconsin border 
for each store in our sample. Of the stores 
in our sample we were able to locate 941 
(94 percent) of the addresses exactly. For 
the remaining 6 percent of stores that we 
could not match exactly, we use the center 
of the city or zip code where the store is 
located to measure the distance to the 
nearest Wisconsin border. Tables 3 and 4 
show how our sample of stores varies by 
both the average distance to the Wisconsin 
border and for stores within fi ve miles of 
the border across all states.
Table 3 (name brand) and Table 4 
(generic) provide a summary of our price 
data across several dimensions. The aver-
age price of name brand cigarettes in the 
pre-tax change survey is $4.36 per pack. 
Importantly for our identifi cation strat-
egy, the average price for name brand 
cigarettes in our control states (IL, MN, 
MI, IA) did not change by more than 6 
cents (MI). The average price of generic 
brand cigarettes in the pre-tax change 
survey is $3.83. In the post tax-change 
survey, the average price of generic brand 
cigarettes increased by 46 cents to $4.29. 
The average price of the generic brand 
cigarettes changed fairly substantially in 
two of our control states, which violates 
one of our identification assumptions 
for difference-in-differences estimation. 
The average price of the generic brand 
cigarettes increased by 14 cents in Illinois, 
and by 10 cents in Michigan.
Table 3 (name brand) and Table 4 
(generic) also show how our price data 
differs for stores that are within fi ve miles 
of the Wisconsin state border. As Table 3 
16 State, county, and city sales tax rates are available at: (1) Illinois Department of Revenue, “Tax Rate Finder,” 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/; (2) Iowa Department of Revenue, “Sales Tax Rate Look Up,” http://www.
iowa.gov/tax; (3) Michigan Department of Revenue, “Taxes,” http://www.michigan.gov/treasury; Minnesota 
Department of Revenue, “Sales and Use Tax,” http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/; (4) Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, “Tax Rates,” http://www.dor.state.wi.us/.
17 The sales tax rates used to calculate the tax-inclusive prices are available from the authors upon request.
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shows, the average price of name brand 
cigarettes at stores within fi ve miles of the 
Wisconsin border is less than the average 
price for stores further from the border 
in all states except Minnesota. In 2008, 
the discount for stores near the border 
is largest in Illinois, where stores within 
fi ve miles of the Wisconsin border have 
an average price that is about 75 cents less 
than other stores in the state. The border 
discount in 2008 is also substantial in 
Michigan and Iowa, where stores within 
fi ve miles of the Wisconsin border have an 
average price that is between 23–33 cents 
per pack less than other stores in those 
states. A similar pattern does not emerge 
for the price of the generic brand cigarettes 
at stores located within fi ve miles of the 
Wisconsin border.
IV. ESTIMATES OF TOBACCO TAX 
   INCIDENCE
Using our unique micro level data on 
the retail price of cigarettes in Wisconsin 
and surrounding states, we can make sev-
eral comparisons that allow us to identify 
the economic incidence of the tobacco tax 
increase. Figure 1 shows a visual repre-
sentation of the price changes that occur 
between December, 2007 (before the tax 
increase) and January, 2008 (after the tax 
December 2007 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price) 
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles) 
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores 
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores 
Number of respondents
January 2008 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles) 
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border 
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores 
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores 
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores 
Number of respondents
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Name Brand Cigarettes
Wisconsin
3.87
(0.29)
3.41
5.00
35.84
87
3.82
3.88
3.86
369
3.96
68
3.81
29
3.86
197
466
 
5.00
(0.33)
3.80
6.63
35.62
88
4.95
5.01
4.99
363
5.10
70
4.89
31
5.00
201
464
Illinois
4.92
(1.49)
3.70
8.93
76.08
32
4.26
5.02
5.01
143
5.30
43
4.27
46
5.30
72
232
 
4.88
(1.45)
3.72
8.93
80.14
33
4.24
4.99
4.98
153
5.21
42
4.33
51
5.31
79
246
Minnesota
4.31
(0.25)
3.97
5.40
38.69
43
4.32
4.30
4.30
156
4.39
31
4.18
10
4.25
89
197
 
4.32
(0.29)
4.05
5.40
38.17
49
4.36
4.30
4.31
167
4.37
31
4.24
10
4.23
96
208
Michigan
5.16
(0.35)
4.31
6.10
33.09
20
4.96
5.25
5.14
54
5.32
6
NA
0
4.98
32
60
 
5.22
(0.40)
4.23
6.47
34.25
20
4.99
5.32
5.21
59
5.35
5
NA
0
5.01
33
64
Iowa
4.89
(0.42)
4.19
5.60
88.38
18
4.64
4.94
5.02
87
4.88
8
4.39
22
5.01
44
117
 
4.89
(0.43)
3.69
5.55
88.64
19
4.70
4.93
5.01
93
4.81
9
4.42
23
5.01
46
125
All 
States
 
4.36
(0.89)
3.41
8.93
50.65
200
4.18
4.40
4.36
809
4.51
156
4.16
107
4.38
434
1,072
 
4.85
(0.79)
3.69
8.93
51.90
209
4.68
4.89
4.87
835
4.98
157
4.49
115
4.89
455
1,107
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increase) at the locations in our sample 
for both the generic and name brand ciga-
rettes. Each dot in Figure 1 represents the 
price change of a retail location between 
December, 2007 and January, 2008. As 
shown by the maps in Figure 1, prices in 
Wisconsin increased almost universally by 
more than the $1 tax for both the generic 
and name brand cigarettes. Figure 1 also 
displays how well the Border States work 
as a control group, as most locations 
in other states did not change cigarette 
prices at all between December, 2007 and 
January, 2008.
To get a precise estimate of the price 
response to the tax change illustrated in 
Figure 1, we estimate (1) and (2) using 
data from our survey of cigarette retail-
ers. Regression results using the panel 
data estimating (1) show that not only do 
consumers pay the entire $1 per pack tax 
increase, but they pay between a 12–17 
cents premium on top of the tax increase. 
That is, as shown in column (1) of Table 
5, we estimate β1 to be equal to about 1.12 
for name brand cigarettes and about 1.17 
for the generic brand using the full sample 
of retail locations. Both of these results are 
precisely estimated, as they are statisti-
cally different from zero at less than the 
one-percent level. The 95 percent confi -
dence interval for the estimates in column 
(1) also shows that the point estimates are 
signifi cantly larger than $1, evidence that 
December 2007 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price) 
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles) 
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores 
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores 
Number of respondents
January 2008 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles) 
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border 
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores 
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores 
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores 
Number of respondents
Table 4
Summary Statistics for Generic Brand Cigarettes
Wisconsin
3.42
(0.32)
2.11
4.91
32.02
53
3.47
3.41
3.44
179
3.34
35
3.43
20
3.43
104
234
4.58
(0.30)
3.35
5.90
31.49
51
4.60
4.57
4.58
161
4.61
29
4.48
22
4.58
104
212
Illinois
3.79
(0.33)
2.66
5.03
95.28
18
3.82
3.78
3.82
57
3.75
20
3.76
29
3.75
23
106
3.93
(0.64)
3.25
7.62
105.95
21
3.88
3.94
4.05
69
3.96
19
3.70
36
3.98
30
124
Minnesota
3.99
(0.20)
3.44
4.70
39.27
37
3.99
4.00
3.99
124
4.03
25
3.87
8
3.97
67
157
4.03
(0.22)
3.24
4.82
40.06
44
4.04
4.03
4.04
132
4.06
29
3.91
9
4.01
74
170
Michigan
4.51
(0.83)
3.18
6.51
30.02
5
3.78
4.84
4.51
16
NA
0
NA
0
4.46
10
16
4.61
(0.62)
3.60
5.40
56.73
1
3.60
4.81
4.61
6
NA
0
NA
0
4.37
4
6
Iowa
4.48
(0.47)
3.54
5.35
88.51
15
4.37
4.50
4.65
67
4.43
8
3.98
21
4.68
35
96
4.50
(0.46)
3.47
5.23
90.18
15
4.37
4.52
4.63
80
4.47
7
4.03
21
4.69
40
108
All 
States
 
3.83
(0.52)
2.11
6.51
53.75
128
3.78
3.84
3.86
443
3.73
88
3.74
78
3.84
239
609
 
4.29
(0.50)
3.24
7.62
59.20
132
4.26
4.29
4.35
448
4.26
84
4.00
88
4.36
252
620
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the tax increase caused a price increase 
larger than the amount of the tax.
Columns 2–5 of Table 5 show regres-
sion results for the various types of retail 
establishments in the panel data. These 
results confi rm the fi nding that the $1 tax 
per pack increase is more than passed on 
to consumers in the form of higher prices, 
and that this result is not unique to the 
type of retail establishment. The results 
for both the generic and name brand 
cigarettes sold at grocery and convenience 
stores, columns (4) and (5) of Table 5, show 
that β1 is less than 1 cent different than 
the coeffi cient using the entire sample, 
indicating no unique response from these 
types of stores. The estimates for β1 in the 
specifi cation using data from stores that 
are tobacco specialty establishments are 
about $1.10 for the name brand and about 
$1.13 for the generic, roughly 3 to 4 cents 
less than the full sample estimates. The 
tobacco specialty store estimates suggest 
that these stores do not include as large 
a premium above the tax as other stores, 
which suggests that this type of retail 
store does not possess the same degree of 
market power that other types of stores in 
our survey may.18
Regression results estimating (2), 
shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
6, using the cross-section data for name 
brand cigarettes, reinforce the fi ndings 
from the panel data estimates. Column 
(1) shows the cross-section results without 
using the indicator variables for the type 
of retail establishment, and column (2) 
shows the estimates controlling for the 
type of retail establishment. The coeffi -
cient of interest in each case, β3, which is 
comparable to β1 in the panel regression, 
is within 1 cent of the panel estimates 
confi rming the over-shifting of the tobacco 
tax that we estimate in the panel regres-
Figure 1
Cigarette Price Change, December 2007–January 2008
Source: Maps were created using Arcmap GIS software, and the data from a survey of cigarette retail establishments.
18 In results not shown, we estimated (1) with interactions for the store type and the Wisconsin variable to test 
the hypothesis that the price change across store types is different. An F-test shows the coeffi cients of the 
interaction between store type and Wisconsin are not signifi cantly different.
Name brand cigarettes Generic cigarettes
Price Change Price Change
–$1.26 - –$0.01
$0.00
$0.01 - $1.00
$1.01 - $2.23
–$2.27 - –$0.01
$0.00
$0.01 - $1.00
$1.01 - $2.15
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Table 5
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices, Results Using Panel Data
Name Brand
Generic
Wisconsin (β1)
 
 
95% Confi dence for β1
 
N
R2
Wisconsin (β1)
 
 
95% Confi dence for β1
 
N
R2
Full Panel
(1)
1.1275***
(0.0093)
 
[1.1093 , 1.1458]
 
1002
0.9364
1.1763***
(0.0246)
 
[1.1279 , 1.2247]
 
474
0.8287
National Chain
(2)
1.117***
(0.0154)
 
[1.0868 , 1.1472]
 
407
0.9287
1.2081***
(0.0391)
 
[1.1308 , 1.2854]
 
184
0.8393
Tobacco
(3)
1.1023***
(0.0455)
 
[1.0119 , 1.1926]
 
101
0.8555
1.1363***
(0.0456)
 
[1.0452 , 1.2274]
 
71
0.8997
Convenience
(4)
1.1316***
(0.0102)
 
[1.1116 , 1.1516]
 
753
0.9423
1.1805***
(0.0309)
 
[1.1197 , 1.2412]
 
338
0.8119
Grocery
(5)
1.1313***
(0.0217)
 
[1.0884 , 1.1742]
 
148
0.949
1.1791***
(0.0578)
 
[1.0637 , 1.2946]
 
65
0.8687
Notes: Results include only the sample of stores for which we have both December and January data. Sample 
includes stores in IA, IL, MN, WI, and the upper peninsula of MI. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***) level.
Table 6
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices, Results Using Repeated Cross-Section Data
Name Brand Generic
Wisconsin (β1)
 
 
January (β2)
 
 
Wisconsin*January (β3)
 
 
National chain
 
 
Tobacco only store
 
 
Grocery store
 
 
95% Confi dence for (β3)
 
N
R2
(1)
–1.0230***
(0.0628)
 
–0.0044
(0.0421)
 
1.1362***
(0.0644)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1.0098 , 1.2627]
 
2,179
0.2779
(2)
–1.0888***
(0.0620)
 
–0.0023
(0.0413)
 
 1.1345***
(0.0632)
 
0.0749**
(0.0348)
 
 –0.4086***
(0.0552)
 
0.1642***
(0.0484)
 
[1.0104 , 1.2585]
 
2,179
0.3058
(3)
–1.0367***
(0.0390)
 
0.0669**
(0.0271)
 
 1.0892***
(0.0450)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1.0009 , 1.1776]
 
1,229
0.5398
(4)
–1.0641***
(0.0383)
 
.0663**
(0.0265)
 
 1.0943***
(0.0439)
 
–0.0058
(0.0240)
 
–0.2623***
(0.0334)
 
–0.0536
(0.0333)
 
[1.0081 , 1.1805]
 
1,229
0.5631
Notes: Results include the full sample of stores for which we have data on in at least one period. Sample includes 
stores in IA, IL, MN, WI, and the upper peninsula of MI. The convenience store dummy variable is excluded; 
results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. All specifi cations include state level dummy vari-
ables for IL, MN and MI and exclude a dummy variable for IA. The results presented for the coeffi cient of interest 
are not sensitive to the state dummy excluded. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***) and 5% (**) levels. 
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sions. The 95 percent confi dence interval 
for each of these estimates is larger than 
the panel regressions; however, our results 
are still signifi cantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent level. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show the 
regression results for estimating (2) using 
the cross-section data for the generic brand 
cigarettes. Column (3) shows the cross-sec-
tion results without controls, and column 
(4) shows the results controlling for the 
type of retail establishment. The coeffi cient 
of interest, β3, is quite a bit lower than 
the comparable β1 from the panel regres-
sions. We estimate the price increase as a 
result of the tax change is approximately 
$1.09 for generic brand cigarettes using 
the repeated cross-section data, roughly 8 
cents less than the estimate using the panel 
data. Again, these results are statistically 
signifi cant at the one percent level, with 
the confi dence interval indicating that 95 
percent of the distribution is greater than 
$1. Although the cross-section results for 
the generic brand cigarettes suggest a 
smaller premium than the panel results, 
they still show evidence of over-shifting 
of the tax burden on to consumers.
The difference in the coeffi cient estimate 
between the panel and repeated cross sec-
tion for generic cigarettes is likely caused 
by the substantial decrease in the grocery 
store premium. As the grocery store coef-
fi cient in column (4) of Table 6 shows, gro-
cery stores sell the generic brand cigarettes 
for about 5 cents less than other stores; 
however, the panel estimates for grocery 
stores indicate that they actually raised 
their price more than other stores. It seems 
that the grocery stores that responded to 
our survey both in January and December 
were more likely to have raised their price 
more for the generic brand cigarettes than 
those who responded to only one of the 
surveys. The coeffi cient for tobacco-only 
stores shows that stores specializing in 
tobacco products sell both name brand (40 
cents) and generic (26 cents) for substan-
tially less than the other types of stores 
surveyed.
A. Estimates of Tobacco Tax Incidence 
  by Geography
Wisconsin shares a border with states 
that have a range of tobacco tax rates, from 
98 cents–$2. Because of the possibility for 
casual smuggling19 in areas close to the 
border, the retail cigarette market may 
not be confi ned to the state. We can test 
for the possibility that the incidence of the 
tobacco tax varies across distance from a 
specifi c state’s border using our geo-coded 
data and altering the econometric specifi -
cations in (1) and (2). To test the effect that 
distance from the Wisconsin state border 
has on tax incidence, we group the data 
into stores that are within one, fi ve, 10, and 
25 miles of each state border (IA, MN, MI, 
IL). We create an indicator variable equal 
to one for each of these groupings and 
run separate regressions for each distance 
category using panel data with following 
econometric specifi cation:
(3) (Pi,jan – Pi,dec) 
   = α + β1(Inside Mile * Statej) + εi
where Inside Mile is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if a store is within one, 
fi ve, 10, or 25 miles of the state border, 
and Statej is a variable indicating the state 
border in question where j references 
either MN, IL, IA, or MI. We estimate (3) 
using only stores in Wisconsin, which 
allows us to test the differential effect of 
the tax change by comparing stores closer 
to another state’s border with stores that 
are further in the interior of the state. The 
19 For studies on cross-border cigarette smuggling see Baltagi and Levin (1986), Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003), 
Stehr (2005), and Lovenheim (2008).
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coeffi cient of interest is β1 (estimated in a 
separate regression for each distance and 
state border) which, if different from zero, 
tells us that stores in Wisconsin within the 
distance boundaries split the incidence of 
the tobacco tax differently with consum-
ers than those further from the Wisconsin 
border. Notice that the β1 coeffi cients in the 
panel specifi cations are not a general dis-
tance premium as the dependent variable 
is the change in the price of cigarettes. The 
results for each separate regression by dis-
tance from the state border in question are 
presented together in Table 7 for both the 
name brand and generic brand cigarettes.
As Table 7 shows, the point estimates in 
each separate regression for the amount 
of over-shifting of the tax is sensitive 
to being near a state border, and to the 
specifi c state border in question. For the 
name brand cigarettes, the only result that 
attains (marginal) statistical signifi cance 
is for stores within 25 miles of the Illinois 
state border, where the over-shifting of the 
tax on the name brand cigarettes is about 
4 cents less than stores in other parts of 
the state. This result suggests that stores 
near the Illinois state border over-shift 
the tax on the name brand cigarettes by 
about 31 percent less than the stores in 
the remainder of the state do.
The incidence estimation results shown 
in Table 7 for stores near the Wisconsin 
border using the generic brand cigarettes 
and panel data display a different pattern 
than the name brand results as well as a 
higher degree of precision. Again, we run 
separate regressions for each distance 
Table 7
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Panel Data 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Name Brand
Generic
Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 5 Miles * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 10 Miles * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 25 Mile * Statej (β1)
 
 
N= 423 in all specifi cations
Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 5 Miles * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 10 Miles * Statej (β1)
 
Inside 25 Miles * Statej (β1)
 
 
N = 161 in all specifi cations
MN Border
(1)
0.035
(.035)
0.021
(.028)
0.015
(.027)
0.012
(.025)
 
–0.125**
(.062)
–0.097*
(.050)
–.094*
(.049)
–.110 ** 
(.047)
IL Border
(2)
–0.065
(.071)
–0.054
(.036)
–0.031
(.026)
–0.04*
(.022)
 
 
0.053
(.103)
–0.016
( .067)
0.033
(.063)
MI Border
(3)
–0.034
(.042)
–0.03
(.033)
–0.025
(.031)
–0.036
(.030)
 
.263** 
(.109)
.164 * 
(.094)
.164* 
(.094)
.164* 
(.094)
IA Border
(4)
–0.051
(.112)
0.068
(.060)
0.02
(.048)
0.004
(.037)
 
 
0.109
(.144)
0.062
(.125)
–0.021
(.096)
Notes: Results include only the sample of stores in Wisconsin for which we have both December and January data.
Results refl ect separate regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wis-
consin, the β1 coeffi cient is reported from each separate regression. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 5% (**) 
and 10% (*) levels.
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and state border given. Column (1) in the 
bottom half of Table 7 shows evidence 
that stores near the Minnesota border 
over-shift the burden of the tax on the 
generic brand cigarettes by substantially 
less than stores in other parts of the state. 
The estimates of β1 suggest that the tax is 
over-shifted by between 9–13 cents less 
than stores in other areas of the state, 
statistically signifi cant at the ten or fi ve 
percent level depending on the mileage 
in question. These estimates imply that 
at least 53 percent of the over-shifting 
premium disappears, with at most 71 
percent disappearing for stores near the 
Minnesota border.
Column (3) in the bottom half of Table 
7 shows that the over-shifting premium 
for the generic brand cigarettes is between 
16–26 cents larger for stores near the 
Michigan border than in other areas of the 
state; the estimates of β1 are statistically 
signifi cant at the fi ve or ten percent level 
depending on the mileage in question. 
The estimates by distance to the Michigan 
border translate into at least a 93 percent 
increase of the amount of over-shifting 
and as much as a 149 percent increase 
in over-shifting in comparison to other 
stores. 
To test the effect that distance has on 
the incidence of tobacco taxation using 
cross-sectional data we use the following 
econometric specifi cation, and estimate 
separate regressions for each distance 
state border pair:
(4) Pi,t = α + β1(January) 
   + β2(Inside Mile * Statej) 
   + β3(January *Inside Mile * Statej) 
   + Zi′γ + εi
where, as in (2), the Zi represents store 
level characteristics, Statej is a variable 
that indicates being near the state border 
in question, where j references either MN, 
IL, IA, or MI. We run the regression for (4) 
using data from only stores in Wisconsin. 
The β3 coeffi cients are the combined effect 
of the tax and of being close to a specifi c 
neighboring state’s border. We run sepa-
rate regressions for each border and each 
measure of closeness to border (one, fi ve, 
10, and 25 miles) compared to being in 
other areas of Wisconsin. The β3 coeffi -
cients have the same interpretation as the 
β1 coeffi cients in (3). The β2 coeffi cient for 
the cross-section specifi cations provide 
an estimate of the general premium or 
discount for retail outlets near the border 
of a specifi c neighboring state (but inside 
of Wisconsin), which we could not obtain 
using the panel specifi cation. As with the 
panel data, we run separate regressions 
for each measure of distance and each 
state border using the cross-section data 
and (4). Table 8 and 9 show estimation 
results of separate regressions for (4) 
using each measure of distance and each 
state border.
The incidence estimates on the name 
brand cigarettes for the cross-section 
results by distance are generally consistent 
with the panel data estimates. Unfortu-
nately, these results are not estimated with 
much precision, as we cannot attach statis-
tical signifi cance to any of the β3 coeffi cients 
for the name brand estimates using cross-
section data. The name brand cross-section 
estimates do, however, produce interesting 
results for the β2 coeffi cient, or the general 
price effect of being close to another state 
border. Column (1) of Table 8 shows that 
there is a substantial discount offered at 
stores in Wisconsin that are within fi ve, 10, 
and 25 miles of the Minnesota state bor-
der. This discount is between 11–13 cents 
per pack of cigarettes and is statistically 
signifi cant at the one or fi ve percent level 
depending on the specifi cation.
The other β2 coeffi cient that is note-
worthy is on the price of name brand 
cigarettes near the Illinois border that sell 
for a premium compared to other areas of 
the state. Column (2) of Table 8 shows that 
the retail price of name brand cigarettes at 
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stores within 25 miles of the Illinois border 
sell for about 7 cents more than at stores 
in other areas of the state, statistically 
signifi cant at the ten percent level. 
The incidence estimates for the generic 
brand cigarettes using cross-section data 
by distance are generally not consistent 
with the panel data estimates or the name 
brand results, as shown in Table 9. None of 
the β3 coeffi cients is statistically different 
than zero, and most of the point estimates 
are smaller than the panel estimates. The 
increase in over-shifting we found for the 
generic brand near the Michigan state 
border using the panel results does not 
hold up to statistical signifi cance tests in 
the cross-section specifi cation, and in some 
cases we fi nd the opposite sign.
The generic brand cross-section esti-
mates produce an interesting result for the 
β2 coeffi cient on stores near the Michigan 
border. These results, shown in column 
(3) of Table 9, suggest that the general 
price effect of being close to the Michigan 
border is large and statistically signifi cant 
for most specifi cations. The estimates of 
β2 suggest that stores in Wisconsin within 
25 miles of the Michigan border sell the 
generic brand cigarettes for as much as 37 
cents per pack more than stores in other 
areas of the state. 
B. Explanation of Tobacco Tax Incidence 
    Results
Our primary estimates of the incidence of 
tobacco taxation are that the $1 tax increase 
is over-shifted to consumers by between 
8–17 cents depending on the econometric 
specifi cation and the type of cigarettes. Our 
Table 8
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Cross-Section Data 
for Name Brand Cigarettes
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β2)
 
Inside 5 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
Inside 10 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
Inside 25 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
January*Inside 1 Mile*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 5 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 10 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 25 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
 
N = 930 in all specifi cations
MN Border
(1)
 
–0.065
(.081)
–.132*** 
(.049)
–.131***
(.048)
–.116** 
(.045)
0.018
(.113)
0.038
(.069)
0.036
(.067)
0.028
(.064)
IL Border
(2)
0.176
(.139)
0.065
(.067)
0.039
(.049)
.067* 
(.040)
–0.066
(.197)
–0.035
(.097)
–0.022
(.070)
–0.025
(.058)
MI Border
(3)
–0.074
(.076)
–0.045
(.061)
–0.057
(.059)
–0.059
(.056)
–0.055
(.135)
–0.074
(.107)
–0.069
(.101)
–0.08
(.094)
IA Border
(4)
 
0.046
(.220)
0.114
(.104)
0.112
(.084)
0.102
(.066)
–0.051
(.311)
–0.018
(.152)
–0.016
(.121)
–0.047
(.094)
Notes: Results include the full sample of stores for which we have data on in at least one period. All Regressions 
include the January indicator as well as grocery, tobacco and national chain variables, the convenience store 
dummy is excluded, results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. Results refl ect separate 
regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wisconsin, the β2 and β3 coef-
fi cients for a given distance and state are reported for each separate regression. Asterisks denote signifi cance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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estimates for stores near the state border 
suggest that the degree of over-shifting is 
sensitive to being near the Minnesota or 
Michigan state borders. Our primary esti-
mates are similar in magnitude to Keeler et 
al. (1996) that suggest a $1 increase in the 
tobacco tax increases the price of cigarettes 
by $1.11. This is encouraging, considering 
that Keeler et al. use annual state level 
data (from 1960–1990) and identify the 
parameter of interest from a series of state 
tax changes. However, both the Keeler et 
al. estimate and the estimates presented in 
this paper are substantially smaller than the 
estimate by Harris (1987) that suggests a $1 
increase in the cigarette tax would result in 
a retail price increase of over $2. 
Our estimation strategy offers sev-
eral advantages over those used in the 
previous studies. First, because we use 
micro-level data from retail locations we 
are able to accurately match county and 
city taxes to our observations. This is in 
sharp contrast to previous studies that use 
state-year level observations that cannot 
separate city and county level taxes or 
differentiate when during the year a tax 
is imposed. This is particularly important 
considering that county taxes are as much 
as $2 per pack, city taxes are as much as 68 
cents per pack in our sample, and tobacco 
prevention groups estimate at least 450 
jurisdictions nationwide have a separate 
tax on tobacco.20
20 See Research Center for Tobacco Free Kids, “Research Center Fact Sheets,” http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
research/factsheets/index.php?CategoryID=18.
Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β2)
 
Inside 5 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
Inside 10 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
Inside 25 Miles* Statej (β2)
 
January*Inside 1 Mile*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 5 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 10 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
January*Inside 25 Miles*Statej (β3)
 
 
N = 446 in all specifi cations
MN Border
(1)
0.022
(.086)
0.011
(.055)
0.008
(.054)
–0.001
(.053)
–0.046
(.123)
–0.054
(.080)
–0.047
(.078)
–0.065
( .075)
IL Border
(2)
–0.165
(.311)
0.054
(.119)
–0.042
(.076)
–0.103
(.068)
–0.069
(.163)
–0.069
(.103)
–0.01
(.095)
MI Border
(3)
0.148
(.132)
 .212* 
(.111)
.371*** 
(.098)
.371*** 
(.098)
0.197
(.296)
0.112
(.208)
–0.086
(.197)
–0.086
(.197)
Notes: Results include the full sample of stores in Wisconsin for which we have data on in at least one period. 
All Regressions include the January indicator as well as grocery, tobacco and national chain variables, the 
convenience store dummy is excluded, results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. Results 
refl ect separate regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wisconsin, the 
β2 and β3 coeffi cients for a given distance and state are reported for each separate regression. Asterisks denote 
signifi cance at the 1% (***) and 10% (*) levels.
Table 9
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Cross-Section Data 
for Generic Brand Cigarettes
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
IA Border
(4)
 
 
0.201
(.156)
0.139
(.140)
0.029
(.101)
 
–0.013
( .221)
–0.015
(.190)
–0.028
(.142)
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Second, we are able to use an isolated 
policy change that offers clean identifi ca-
tion of the tobacco tax increase on retail 
prices. We discuss the robustness of this 
strategy in the following section, but it 
is noteworthy that tobacco tax increases 
could become law at the same time as 
other prevention methods or policies that 
may affect the demand for cigarettes (an 
alcohol tax change for instance). Lastly, 
our data come from an extremely short 
time window and relatively small geo-
graphic area compared to studies that use 
state-year variation. This is advantageous 
as we do not have to correct for infl ation 
over time or adjust for changes in the cost 
of living when we use the difference-in-
difference method. 
Over-shifting of the tobacco tax is 
consistent with over-shifting found in 
studies of alcohol tax incidence; however 
alcohol tax studies generally fi nd a sub-
stantially larger amount of over-shifting.21 
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) use 
state-year tax variation to identify the 
incidence of alcohol taxation and find 
that it is over-shifted to consumers by as 
much as 186 percent of the tax. Kenkel 
(2005) uses a 2002 alcohol tax increase in 
the state of Alaska as a natural experiment 
to calculate the incidence of taxation on 
beer, wine and spirits. Kenkel fi nds that 
alcohol taxes are more than fully shifted 
to consumers across multiple brands and 
types of alcohol, and that for some brands 
the amount of over-shifting is more than 
400 percent of the tax. Rojas (2008) uses 
the 1991 increase in the federal excise tax 
on beer as a natural experiment to assess 
a variety of pricing models in the beer 
industry; his work implies that beer taxes 
are more than fully passed on to consum-
ers by as much as 237 percent of the tax. 
Generally the empirical work on gaso-
line excise taxes shows that these taxes are 
not over-shifted to consumers. Chouinard 
and Perloff (2004) estimate the incidence 
of gasoline taxes and fi nd that a 1 cent 
increase in the federal tax raises the retail 
price by 0.47 cents, but that an increase in 
the state gasoline tax by 1 cent raises the 
retail price by 1.01 cents. Doyle and Sam-
phantharak (2008) use suspensions and 
subsequent reinstatements of the gasoline 
sales taxes in Illinois and Indiana as natural 
experiments to estimate the incidence of 
gasoline taxation and fi nd less than full 
shifting of the tax to consumers. In addi-
tion, they fi nd some evidence that suggests 
stores react differently to tax changes as the 
distance from the state border increases. 
Alm, Sennoga, and Skidmore (2009) use 
monthly data from ACCRA over the period 
1984–1999 to estimate that gasoline taxes 
are fully shifted to consumers. 
Economic theory suggests that in a per-
fectly competitive market with constant 
marginal costs, excise taxes will be fully 
passed to consumers but never over-shifted. 
Over-shifting results are often explained 
using models of imperfect competition. 
These models, advanced by Delipalla and 
Keen (1992), and Anderson, de Palma, 
and Kreider (2001), show how the type of 
product (homogeneous or differentiated), 
the type of imperfect competition (Bertrand, 
Cournot, oligopoly), and the demand elas-
ticity for the product explain the incidence 
of per unit and ad valorem taxes. 
Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider 
(2001) show that in markets with a dif-
ferentiated product where the sellers 
have an oligopoly, fi rms engage in price 
or Bertrand competition, and a unit tax 
is imposed, the tax can be over-shifted to 
consumers in the form of higher prices.22 
21 Estimates on the incidence of general sales taxes fi nd that the amount of tax burden passed on to consumers 
varies substantially across the type of product used to create the estimates, although some estimates show 
evidence of substantial over-shifting as shown by Besley and Rosen (1999) and Poterba (1996).
22 Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) also show this result holds if fi rms compete by changing output, or 
in a Cournot game.
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The intuition behind this result is that 
in Bertrand competition, a given fi rm’s 
best response, or reaction function, to a 
price increase of a competitor is to also 
increase prices. A tax increase can be 
thought of as a price increase by one fi rm 
that causes subsequent price increases 
of other fi rms. Firms increase their own 
prices because of the higher cost imposed 
by the tax; this effect is magnifi ed because 
they are reacting to the higher price they 
observe from competitors, resulting in 
over-shifting of the tax to consumers. The 
degree of the over-shifting of the tax in this 
case depends on the slope of the fi rms’ 
reaction functions, or how much they 
increase price in response to other fi rm’s 
price increases. This explanation is intui-
tive, however; for over-shifting to occur 
the model requires the product demand 
elasticity to be less than negative one.23 
This requirement is not likely to be met 
in the case of cigarettes as estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, 
as reviewed by Chaloupka and Warner 
(2000), fall between –0.30 and –0.50. 
The Delipalla and Keen (1992) model 
requires a homogenous product, where 
the sellers have an oligopoly, and fi rms 
can enter the market freely (so that there 
are no profi ts). This model fi ts the empiri-
cal elasticity of demand estimates better, 
as over-shifting of a per-unit tax (assum-
ing that firms have constant marginal 
cost of production) will occur as long as 
the product demand elasticity is less than 
zero.24 Although the Delipalla and Keen 
model fi ts the empirical work better, the 
assumption of a homogenous product 
may be strong in the case of cigarettes 
depending on if consumers view brands 
as different products, as there are 278 
brands of cigarettes certifi ed for sale in 
Wisconsin.25 
The Delipalla and Keen model is also 
helpful in understanding the differences in 
some of our incidence estimates between 
generic and name brand cigarettes.26 One 
explanation for this difference is that the 
demand elasticity is different for name 
brand and generic cigarettes. Using the 
Delipalla and Keen formula for over-
shifting27 the amount of over-shifting dif-
ference we observe in the full panel (Table 
5, column 1) implies that generic brand 
cigarettes have a demand elasticity that is 
–0.29 and that name brand cigarettes have a 
demand elasticity that is –0.22.28 This result 
implies that consumers are more sensitive 
to price changes in generic brand ciga-
rettes. This is somewhat counter-intuitive if 
generic and name brand cigarette consum-
ers are the same group. However, if these 
groups are different sets of consumers the 
generic consumer group may be more price 
sensitive if they have lower incomes. Alter-
natively, name-brand smokers may have 
preferences for smoking that are shaped 
by brand loyalty, making them less price 
sensitive than generic brand smokers. 
A second theoretical explanation for our 
empirical fi ndings is the model proposed 
23 Young and Bielinska-Kwapiza (2002) also offer an explanation of over-shifting that requires the product 
demand elasticity to be less than negative one.
24 Cotterill, Egan, and Buckhold (2001) offer an explanation of over-shifting that only requires negative demand 
elasticity that is constant where the degree of over-shifting is also a function of the number of sellers.
25 See Wisconsin Department of Justice, “Directory of Certifi ed Tobacco Manufacturers and Brands,” http://
www.doj.state.wi.us/dls/tobacco/index.html.
26 Although many of the incidence point estimates for the name brand cigarettes are within the 95 percent 
confi dence interval of the generic brand estimates (and vice versa), some of our primary results using panel 
data suggest that tax incidence is statistically different for generic and name brand cigarettes.
27 Assuming that fi rms have constant marginal costs the rate of over-shifting, R is defi ned as R = 2/(2−(λE/n)), 
where n is the number of sellers, λ is the change in industry output that occurs for a given fi rms change in 
output and E is the absolute value of demand elasticity.
28 For this calculation we impose the additional assumption that fi rms react identically to a change in industry 
output so that λ = n, as described in Delipalla and Keen.
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by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994). 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy propose 
that because cigarette companies work 
as an oligopoly, they obtain maximum 
profi t by raising the price of their prod-
uct on addicted smokers, or those who 
have relatively inelastic demand and 
will continue to smoke even after a tax 
increase. Cigarette sellers realize that 
they will lose casual or new smokers as 
a result of the tax increase. However, the 
profi t gained from increasing the price 
paid by addicted smokers will offset the 
future losses from reduced smoking by 
the casual or new smokers that results 
from the price increase in excess of the 
amount of the tax. Although the Becker, 
Grossman, and Murphy model may 
explain some of the price increase result-
ing from a tobacco tax increase, it does not 
guarantee over-shifting like the Delipalla 
and Keen and Anderson, de Palma, and 
Kreider models do for certain demand 
elasticities. 
Finally, some of the over-shifting of 
the cigarette tax in Wisconsin could be 
the result of retailers using a simple cost-
plus pricing mechanism. Wisconsin has a 
“minimum mark up” law on retail sales 
of cigarettes (The Unfair Sales Act, Wis. 
Stats s 100.30). This law requires retail 
cigarette venders to sell cigarettes for at 
least 6 percent more than the cost, includ-
ing the tobacco tax, of buying them from 
a wholesaler or manufacturer. Because 
of this law, retailers would require a cost 
adjustment from wholesalers to legally 
adjust their prices by less than the amount 
of the tax increase. If wholesalers do not 
adjust cost, and retailers increase the 
price by the amount of the tax plus the 
minimum mark-up we would expect that 
the tax to be passively over-shifted in the 
form of higher prices. This might account 
for some, but not all, of the over-shifting 
that we observe.
C. Methodology Concerns and 
  Robustness Checks
There are two main criticisms of our 
methodology for identifying the incidence 
of tobacco taxation that we have not yet 
addressed. The fi rst is that although we 
look at prices in Wisconsin before and 
after the tax change, we cannot rule out 
that there are other factors that are causing 
prices to change besides the tax increase. 
The second is that retail cigarette outlets 
in Wisconsin may be changing the price 
of their product prior to the date of the 
tax increase in response to the looming 
law change and that this response biases 
our estimates. 
The difference-in-differences identifi -
cation strategy we use assumes that the 
price change that would have occurred in 
Wisconsin in the absence of the tax change 
is equal to the price change that actually 
occurred over the same time period in 
the Border States. We believe that our 
assumption is reasonable considering that 
the average price change in Border States 
for name brand cigarettes was less than 1 
cent and for generic brand cigarettes was 
1 cent. This does not, however, rule out 
that other factors in Wisconsin changed 
during the period covered by our data. 
We are aware of one minor law change 
in Wisconsin that may have altered the 
price of cigarettes in addition to the tax 
increase. Beginning January 1, 2008, Wis-
consin began offering a free two-week 
supply of tobacco cessation medication 
to anyone requesting it through a toll-
free phone call. The medication includes 
nicotine patches, gum and lozenges.29 The 
offer is for a one-time supply and ranges 
in value between $50–100. According 
to conversations with administrators at 
Wisconsin’s Office of Tobacco Preven-
tion and Control, only 7,768 medication 
packets were distributed in January, 2008. 
29 See University of Wisconsin Center for Tobacco Research and Intervention, “Quit Line,” at http://www.ctri.
wisc.edu/.
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Considering that there are approximately 
1.1 million smokers in Wisconsin, the 
tobacco cessation medication program 
reached far less than one percent of the 
smoking population. We believe that any 
potential bias in our estimates from this 
program would work toward lowering 
our estimated coefficients. We are not 
aware of any other law change or trends 
that would affect our results.
We also examined whether the pos-
sibility that fi rms might alter their prices 
in anticipation of tax change might be a 
serious problem. Specifi cally, we admin-
istered a secondary survey of establish-
ments in our sample to ask them about 
this possibility. We randomly selected 50 
stores in Wisconsin from our sample and 
asked them about the timing of their price 
changes as a result of the tax increase. 
Specifi cally, we asked the establishment 
manager if they had changed prices on 
exactly January 1, 2008. Of the 50 store 
managers surveyed, 49 stated that they 
had changed prices exactly on January 1. 
The lone exception stated that they had 
waited until about a week after January 
1 to increase prices. We also asked if they 
had changed cigarette prices prior to the 
January 1 tax policy change. None of 
the 50 respondents in our survey stated 
that they changed prices in anticipation 
of the tax change. Although the sample 
size is quite small, these survey results 
support our assumption that cigarette 
prices did not change in anticipation of 
the tax change. 
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco taxes represent about $22 bil-
lion dollars annually in federal and state 
government revenues. Although the 
statutory incidence of these taxes falls on 
tobacco sellers, the economic incidence is 
often assumed to fall largely on tobacco 
consumers. The evidence presented in this 
paper suggests that not only do consum-
ers pay the entire economic burden of the 
tobacco tax, but that they also pay a pre-
mium in addition to the amount of tax. We 
fi nd that the incidence of tobacco taxation 
is over-shifted to consumers by between 
8–17 percent of the amount of the tax. This 
amount of over-shifting is similar to that 
found by Keeler et al. (1996), although our 
data and methodology differ substantially. 
The over-shifting we fi nd is substantially 
smaller than the over-shifting of general 
sales taxes that Besley and Rosen (1999) 
fi nd for some products (such as bread 
and underwear). The smaller over-shifting 
that we fi nd is consistent with consumers 
being relatively more price sensitive for 
cigarettes compared with the necessity-
type products with few (if any) substitutes 
that fi nd larger amounts of over-shifting.
It seems that over-shifting of the tax 
is aiding policy makers in reducing con-
sumption of cigarettes in Wisconsin. Data 
on the amount of cigarettes purchased in 
Wisconsin show that cigarette sales have 
declined since the introduction of the tax. 
The number of packs of cigarettes sold in 
Wisconsin decreased from 394 million in 
2007 to 335 million in 2008,30 a decline of 
nearly 59 million packs.31 The reduction 
in cigarettes purchased was not enough 
to offset revenue gains from the increased 
amount of tax, as tax revenues from ciga-
rette sales in Wisconsin increased from 
$298 million 2007 to $589 million in 2008. 
Our paper is unique in that we are 
able to estimate how the incidence of a 
cigarette tax depends on the distance that 
a retail location is from the border of a 
state where taxes are different. We show 
that the amount of over-shifting is in fact 
30 This information was obtained through personal correspondence with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue.
31 We hesitate to infer causality, as we are not making this comparison with neighboring states that may be 
affected by similar overall trends in cigarette purchases. It is also possible that the decreased purchases in 
Wisconsin are offset by increased smuggling across state borders.
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sensitive to how far a retail establishment 
is from a state border. The amount of over-
shifting is between 53–71 percent less for 
stores near the Minnesota border (where 
the tobacco tax is lower after the tax 
change in Wisconsin). In contrast, stores 
near the Michigan border (where the 
tobacco tax is higher before and after the 
law change) gain at least 93 percent and 
at most 149 percent of the over-shifting 
premium. The difference in over-shifting 
premiums is consistent with recent evi-
dence presented by Lovenheim (2008) on 
casual cigarette smuggling across state 
borders. The relationship between ciga-
rette prices, smuggling, and distance to a 
state’s border suggests that policy makers 
may want to coordinate tax rates or tax 
rate increases with neighboring states if 
the goal is to reduce tobacco consumption.
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